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Abstract. We investigate themodal logic of the generic multiverse which
is a bimodal logic with operators corresponding to the relations “is a forc-
ing extension of” and “is a ground model of”. The fragment of the first
relation is the modal logic of forcing and was studied by the authors in
earlier work. The fragment of the second relation is the modal logic of
grounds and will be studied here for the first time. In addition, we discuss
which combinations of modal logics are possible for the two fragments.
1 Introduction
1.1 The generic multiverse
Recently, the generic multiverse has become a concept of great interest to set
theorists and philosophers of mathematics alike:
The generic multiverse is generated from each universe of the collection
by closing under generic extensions (enlargements) and under generic
refinements (inner models of a universe which the given universe is a
generic extension of). (W. Hugh Woodin, [21])
If you fix a universe of set theory V and iteratively build all set forcing exten-
sions and ground models—and throughout this article unless stated specifically
otherwise we shall mean always set forcing when discussing forcing—you nat-
urally produce a Kripke structure GMpV q consisting of these worlds together
with the accessibility relation M Ď N (“N is a forcing extension of M”) and
‹ The research of the first author has been supported in part by NSF grant DMS-
0800762, PSC-CUNY grant 64732-00-42 and Simons Foundation grant 209252. The
second author would like to thank the CUNY Graduate Center in New York for
their hospitality during his sabbatical in the fall of 2009. In addition, both authors
acknowledge the generous support provided to them as visiting fellows in Spring
2012 at the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences in Cambridge, U.K.
2 J. D. Hamkins, B. Lo¨we
its converse relation N Ě M (“M is a ground of N”). Hugh Woodin has inves-
tigated multiverse truth, that is, truth in all models of the generic multiverse,
in connection with his programme to solve the alethic status of the continuum
hypothesis. The first author has proposed a philosophy of mathematics based
on a broader multiverse perspective, where we have many different legitimate
concepts of set (not merely those arising by set forcing), and these are instanti-
ated in their corresponding set-theoretic universes, which relate in diverse ways
as forcing extensions, large cardinal ultrapowers, definable inner models and so
on [9]. Although the generic multiverse of a model of set theory is merely a local
neighborhood within the broader multiverse, nevertheless we take it that our
project in this article, to study the forcing modalities of the generic multiverse,
surely engages with the multiverse perspective.
Due to the fact that the relations Ď and Ě are converses of each other,
the bimodal logic of the Kripke structure pGMpV q,Ď,Ěq is similar to temporal
logics where the modality F (“there is a time in the future”) is converse to the
modality P (“there is a time in the past”) [20]. It is our overall aim to investigate
this bimodal logic of the general multiverse and find out which validities hold in
general (provably in ZFC) or in the multiverse generated from specific universes.
1.2 The modal logic of forcing and related work
In our previous paper [11], we introduced the modal logic of forcing and proved
that the ZFC-provably valid principles of forcing were exactly those in the modal
theory known as S4.2. The modal logic of forcing corresponds to the monomodal
fragment of the modal logic discussed in § 1.1 that only uses the relation Ď; or
to the part of the generic multiverse that is generated only by the operation of
taking forcing extensions and not ground models.
In [11], we not only consider the ZFC-provable modal logic of forcing, but
also the modal logic of forcing of particular universes V . We show that this
modal logic always lies between S4.2 and S5 and that the two extreme values
are realized (for more details, cf. § 1.4). Various other aspects of the modal logic
of forcing are considered in [15,12,3,4,16,19,2,1,10]. The paper [8] presented at
ICLA 2009 gives an overview of the status of research and creates a connection
between the modal logic of forcing and “set-theoretic geology”, i.e., going down
from a universe to its ground models. This connection is further developed in
this paper.
1.3 The results of this paper
As stated above, our overall aim is to understand the bimodal logic of the generic
multiverse. However, we know rather little about the general status of the bi-
modal logic (cf. Footnote 7). Instead of the bimodal theory, we consider the
two monomodal fragments (the modal logic of forcing and the modal logic of
grounds) and their possible combinations.
The main result of this paper is Theorem 6, constructing a model of set theory
whose modal logic of grounds is S4.2. This theorem is the downward analogue
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of the main result in [11], where we showed that the modal logic of forcing over
L is S4.2. Based on the proof idea of the main result, we then make a foray into
the bimodal world, by considering which combinations are possible for the two
monomodal fragments; i.e., for which pairs pΛ,Λ˚q can we find a model V such
that MLpo, V q “ Λ and MLp
o
, V q “ Λ˚. We consider all possible combinations
with Λ,Λ˚ P tS4.2, S5u.
The paper is organized as follows: in § 1.4, we give the necessary definitions
in order to discuss the basic properties of the modal logic of grounds (and how
it differs from the modal logic of forcing) in § 2. In § 4, we finally consider the
various combinations of upward and downward modal logics. The paper is not
self-contained and uses ideas and concepts from the papers [11,18]; the proofs
of our theorems are sketches and will be presented in more detail in the journal
version of the paper.
1.4 Definitions
In the following, we denote by P a countable set of propositional letters; for modal
operators o and o, Lo and Lo, oare the monomodal and bimodal propositional
languages with the appropriate operators. We assume that the reader is familiar
with the standard axioms and systems of monomodal logic, in particular, .2, S4,
S4.2, and S5 (if not, there is a summary in [11, § 1]).
By LP, we denote the first-order language of set theory with its set of sen-
tences SentpLPq. Any function I : P Ñ SentpLPq is called an interpretation. An
interpretation I generates a valuation of any Kripke structure pF,Rq in which
the worlds consist of modelsM of set theory and R is any relation between them:
via
I˚pMq :“ tp ; M |ù Ippqu,
pF,R, I˚q becomes a Kripke model (similarly, for the bimodal language if we
have two relations on F ).
Note that in our special case (when R “ Ď), the validity of a modal formula
at a world of the Kripke model is not just a meta-theoretic property of the
Kripke model, but can be expressed in the language of set theory: e.g., oϕ is
interpreted by “for all generic extensions, ϕ holds” which by the Forcing Theorem
[13, Theorem 14.6] is equivalent to “for all Boolean algebras B, we have that
JϕKB “ 1”. Similarly, if R “ Ě, we can use a theorem of Laver’s (cf. [14]) that
the ground model is definable with parameters in the forcing extension, in order
to see that “for all ground models, ϕ holds” is expressible in the language of set
theory (this observation is due to Reitz, cf. [5, Theorem 8]).
These observations are closely related to Woodin’s result about multiverse
truth:
Theorem 1 (Woodin, 2009) There is a recursive transformation ϕ ÞÑ ϕ˚
such that M |ù ϕ˚ is equivalent to the statement “for every model N in the
generic multiverse generated by M , ϕ is true”.
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The fact that the modalities are expressible in the language of set theory
allows us to move from interpretations to translations : We call a function H :
Lo, oÑ SentpLPq a translation if
– Hpϕ^ ψq “ Hpϕq ^Hpψq,
– Hp ϕq “  Hpϕq,
– Hpoϕq is the sentence stating “for all forcing extensions M , we have M |ù
Hpϕq”, and
– Hp oϕq is the sentence stating “for all grounds M , we have M |ù Hpϕq”.
Now, we can define the modal logic of the multiverse and two of its fragments:
fixing a universe V , we call
MLpo,
o
, V q :“ tϕ P Lo, o; for all translations H , V |ù Hpϕqu
the modal logic of the generic multiverse generated by V . Similarly,
MLpo, V q :“ tϕ P Lo ; for all translations H , V |ù Hpϕqu, and
MLp o, V q :“ tϕ P L o; for all translations H , V |ù Hpϕqu
are the modal logic of forcing and the modal logic of grounds at V , respectively.
Metaphorically, we think of forcing extensions going upwards and thus the rela-
tion being a ground model going downwards. We therefore use the words “up-
ward” and “downward” to indicate which modalities we are talking about: e.g.,
if we say that a model V satisfies upward S4.2, we mean that MLpo, V q “ S4.2;
similarly, we talk of “upward buttons” and “downward buttons” (see below).
As mentioned, in [11, Theorem 21], we proved that for any universe V , we
get that
S4.2 ĎMLpo, V q Ď S5,
and that the two extreme values are obtained. This immediately implies that
the ZFC-provable modal logic of forcing
tϕ P Lo ; for all translations H , ZFC $ Hpϕqu
is exactly S4.2. Two facts about forcing are crucial for this result: the first is that
the axiom .2 is always a validity for the modal logic of forcing over any universe
V (cf. [15] and [10, Theorem 7] for the theoretical background), providing the
lower bound; the second is the existence of independent switches over each model
of set theory [11, Theorem 17]. We shall see that the situation is quite different
for the modal logic of grounds. Note that it is not known whether the modal
logic of forcing can obtain any other value than S4.2 or S5 [11, Question 19].
In order to show upper bounds for a modal logic, we used certain control
statements called buttons and switches : a switch is a statement ϕ such that ϕ
and  ϕ are both necessarily possible. A button is a statement ϕ that is neces-
sarily possibly necessary. These controls are independent if they can be operated
independently, without affecting the status of the others (cf. [11, p. 1789] or
[10, § 4] for more detail). We shall use the abstract results that produce upper
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bounds from the existence of control statements in the proof sketches in this
paper. For this we call a function σ : P Ñ Ll a substitution (this is the purely
modal version of our notion of interpretation above); every substitution induces
a function σˆ on the entire set of modal formulas. If pF,R, v, wq is a pointed
Kripke model, we let MLpF,R, v, wq :“ tϕ P Ll ; for all substitutions σ, we have
that F,R, v, w |ù σˆpϕqu.
Theorem 2 If a pointed reflexive and transitive Kripke model pF,R, v, wq has
arbitrarily large finite independent families of buttons and switches, then
MLpF,R, v, wq Ď S4.2
[10, Theorem 13].
Theorem 3 If a pointed reflexive and transitive Kripke model pF,R, v, wq has
arbitrarily large finite independent families of switches, then
MLpF,R, v, wq Ď S5
[10, Theorem 10].
2 Basic Results about the modal logic of grounds.
It is easy to see that every S4 assertion is downward valid (since a ground of a
ground is a ground), but things are not as easy with the axiom .2. This axiom
would be valid if the answer to the following question is “Yes”:
Question 4 Let V be a model of set theory, and M and N two grounds of V ,
i.e., V “M rGs “ N rHs for some generic filters G and H. Is there some model
K which is a ground of both M and N , i.e., there are K-generic filters G˚ and
H˚ such that KrG˚s “ M and KrH˚s “ N? In other words, is Ě directed
among the grounds of V ?
However, we do not know the answer to this question. We shall say that
a universe V in whose generic multiverse the answer to Question 4 is “Yes”
satisfies the axiom of downward directedness of grounds (DDG). In all universes
for which we can determine the truth value of DDG, it is true.
The upper bound for the modal logic of forcing was S5, but the situation
for the modal logic of grounds is different. We denote by PL (for “propositional
logic”) the modal logic satisfying lpØ ♦pØ p, i.e., the modal logic of a single
reflexive point. By GA, we denote the ground axiom of [18] stating that the
universe is not a non-trivial forcing extension of an inner model.5 Clearly, the
constructible universe satisfies GA.
Observation 5 If V |ù GA, then MLpo, V q “ PL.
5 The ground axiom is jointly due to Reitz and the first author; cf. [7,17].
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3 S4.2 as the modal logic of grounds
The following theorem provides us with a model in which we can determine the
modal logic of grounds. Its proof will serve as the underlying idea for the results
in § 4.
Theorem 6 If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC whose ground
valid assertions are exactly those in the modal theory S4.2.
Proof sketch. The idea of this proof is to use the bottomless model of [18]:
Let RegL denote the class of regular L-cardinals. Force over L with
P “
ź
γPRegL
Addpγ, 1q,
where we use Easton support and we use Addpγ, 1q as defined in L. Let V “
LrGs, where G is L-generic for this forcing.
First, following Reitz, we argue that every ground model of V contains a tail
LrGαs, where Gα “ GæPα, and Pα “ Pærα,8q. That is, Pα is the tail forcing,
using only the factors from α onward. Suppose that W is a ground of V , so that
W rHs “ V “ LrGs. If the filter Gα is not in W , then it has a name there, and
the Boolean value of the statement that this name is decided in certain ways
compatible with the actual values of Gα will be a strictly descending sequence
of Boolean values in the W -forcing, which violates the chain condition of that
forcing (when α is much larger than that forcing). So, for large α, Gα is an
element of W .
In [18], Reitz used this to show that V has no bedrock, and we use the same
argument to show that for any two groundsM and N , we find α and β such that
LrGαs is a ground of M and LrGβs is a ground of N . Then if µ :“ maxtα, βu,
LrGµs is a ground of both M and N . This proves that DDG holds in V , and
thus .2.
We now show that there are no additional modal validities by using Theo-
rem 2: Divide the regular cardinals above ℵω into ω many disjoint classes Γn, each
containing unboundedly many cardinals. Enumerate each class Γn “ tγ
n
α ; α ă
Ordu in order. Let sn be the statement “the least α such that there exists an
L-generic subset of γnα is even.” These statements are all true in V , since the
corresponding α is 0 in every case, as the forcing G explicitly adds an L-generic
subset of every γnα, including α “ 0. In any ground model W of V , we can go to
a deeper ground which is a tail extension, and then selectively remove additional
factors of G on indices in each Γn so as to realize any desired configuration of the
switches in L. So the sn’s are independent switches. Now let bn be the statement:
“there is no L-generic subset of ℵLn”. This statement is false in V , but true in
any ground model of V omitting the factor at ℵLn . Furthermore, once true, the
statement remains true in any deeper ground. Thus, each bn is a button. Finally,
all these buttons and switches are independent, because each is controlled by re-
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moving disjoint factors of G.6 Thus, Theorem 2 yields that MLp o, V q “ S4.2. l
It follows that the ZFC-provably valid principles of the modal of logic of
grounds is a theory containing S4 and contained within S4.2. If DDG is a theorem
of ZFC, the ZFC-provable modal logic of grounds is exactly S4.2.
4 Combinations
So far, we have looked at the modal logic of forcing and the modal logic of grounds
in isolation, but ultimately, we are interested in determining the entire bimodal
logic of the multiverse. Currently, we know almost nothing about the validity of
mixed bimodal formulas beyond those validities that follow from the fact that
the modal operators o and oare defined by converse relations.7 However, we
can say something about possible combinations of modal logics of forcing with
modal logics of grounds (in the case of Theorems 8 and 9 under mild large
cardinal assumptions).
Theorem 7 If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC whose modal
logic of forcing and modal logic of grounds are both S4.2.
Proof sketch. In fact, this is the model V constructed in the proof of The-
orem 6: since S4.2 is a general lower bound for the modal logic of forcing, we
only have to show that independent upward buttons and switches exist. We have
such a family for L,8 and by observing that the forcing to add G was cardinal-
preserving and the GCH holds, we can use the buttons proposed by Rittberg
[19] or Friedman, Fuchino and Sakai [2] or, alternatively, our stationary buttons
from [11, Theorem 29] (provided that we start the other forcing above ω1). The
switches are GCH at ℵω`n. l
Theorem 8 If ZFC`“there is an inaccessible cardinal δ in L such that Lδ ă L”
is consistent, then there is a model of set theory whose modal logic of forcing is
S4.2 and whose modal logic of grounds is S5.
Proof sketch. This proof is a combination of the construction in Theorem 6
and an idea from [6, Theorem 5]. We start with an inaccessible cardinal δ in L
such that Lδ ă L and force as in the proof of Theorem 6 with the Easton support
product P :“
ś
γPRegL Addpγ, 1q to obtain LrGs. Since δ was inaccessible in L,
Pδ is just P as defined in Lδ and we took a direct limit at δ; thus, we still
6 Note that L-generic Cohen subsets of different regular cardinals in L are necessarily
mutually generic.
7 E.g., we know that pÑ o o p and pÑ o o  p hold.
8 Note that the buttons provided in the proof of [11, Lemma6.1] are problematic since
we do not know how to prove their independence, but there are other independent
buttons in that paper. Cf. the discussion at the end of [10, § 4].
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have LδrGδs ă LrGs. We claim that V :“ LrG
δs satisfies the conclusion of the
theorem.
Upward S4.2 follows as in the proof of Theorem 7. Let us show that all
downward buttons are pushed (this will establish S5 as a lower bound for the
modal logic of grounds): If there is a ground pushing a downward button, then
this fact is expressible, and so there must be a ground of LδrGδs pushing that
button, and so this same forcing works with LrGs. So there is a small forcing
pushing that button. And this small forcing ground will contain LrGδs, so it is
already pushed in LrGδs.
In order to show that we have exactly S5 as the modal logic of grounds, we
use Theorem 3 and observe that the switches of the proof of Theorem 6 still
work. l
We remark that if a universe has an independent family of upward switches
and buttons, then so does any ground of that universe. This means that upward
S4.2 is downwards necessary. Similarly, if a model has downward buttons and
switches, then this remains upward necessary.9
Now, we consider the dual situation to that of Theorem 8: upward S5 and
downward S4.2.
Theorem 9 If ZFC`“there is an inaccessible cardinal δ in L such that Lδ ă L”
is consistent, then there is a model of set theory whose modal logic of forcing is
S5 and whose modal logic of grounds is S4.2.
Proof sketch. Again, this proof is a combination of the constructions in The-
orem 6 and [6, Theorem 5]. Start in L with Lδ ă L and δ inaccessible in L.
Force to LrGs with the Easton support product P :“
ś
γPRegL Addpγ, 1q, as in
Theorem 6. As before in the proof of Theorem 8, we still have LδrGδs ă LrGs
(as δ was inaccessible in L). We can now appeal to the definability of forcing
relation and the fact that Lδ ă L: anything a condition p forces over L with P
is the same as what it forces over Lδ with Pδ.
Finally, we perform the forcing to obtain upwards S5 from [6, Theorem 5] to
obtain LrGsrhs. This forcing is the same as the Le´vy collapse making δ into ω1.
In LrGsrhs, we have upward S5. However, we also have downward .2: any ground
of LrGsrhs will contain some tail LrGαs just as in Theorem 6, and thus we can
take maximums as there to verify .2. But now we also have downward buttons
and switches, just as in Theorem 6. l
Theorems 7, 8, and 9 take care of three of the four possible distributions of the
theories S4.2 and S5 to the upward and downward modal logics. This naturally
raises the question whether it is possible to have S5 in both directions. We’ll
close this paper with the simple proof of the negative answer to this question:
9 Unfortunately, we cannot conclude that downward S4.2 is upwards necessary, since
we do not know whether downward .2 is valid in every model of set theory.
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Theorem 10 There is no model of set theory such that both its modal logic of
forcing and its modal logic of grounds are S5.
Proof. Let us call an ordinal α a ground cardinal if there is a ground in which
α is a cardinal. Let γ be the least infinite ground cardinal; clearly, γ ď ω1. The
statement “γ “ ω1” is a downward button, but its negation is an upward button.
So, if we had a model V with MLpo, V q “ S5 “ MLp
o
, V q, then γ “ ω1 would
have to be true by downward S5, but false by upward S5.
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